PARANOID READING AND REPARATIVE READING; OR, YOU'RE SO PARANOID YOU PROBABLY THINK THIS INTRODUCTION IS ABOUT YOU EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK
Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction came together unprogrammatically. Invited by the journal Studies in the Novel to edit a special issue, I asked forty or so writers I admire whether they could find room on their agendas to write something that would, loosely speaking, convene the rubrics "novel" and "queer." I felt more than fortunate in the response, when these startlingly imaginative essays started tumbling in at a rate that soon overfilled the journal -and didn't slow down even then.
Unmistakably the essays pointed toward a book. But excited by the force, the originality, and in many cases the beauty of these pieces, I still found it difficult to articulate more than a negative sense of what kind of a moment they might collectively represent in queer theory or in literary criticism. Clearly and queerly enough, they share a relaxed, unseparatist hypothesis of the much to be gained by refraining from a priori oppositions between queer texts (or authors) and non-queer ones, or female ones and male. In fact, the list of damaging a priori oppositions to which these essays quiet1y, collectively find alternative approaches is very impressive: the authors transmit new ways of knowing that human beings are also machines, are also animals; that an ethic or aesthetic of truthtelling need not depend on any reified notion of truth; that the materiality of human bodies, of words, and of economic production may misrepresent but cannot simply eclipse one another; that pleasure, grief, excitement, boredom, satisfaction are the substance of politics rather than their antithesis; that affect and cognition are not very distant processes; that visual perception need not be conceptually isolated from the other four bodily senses; that gender differentiation is crucial to human experience but in no sense coextensive with it; that it's well to attend intimately to literary texts, not because their transformative energies either transcend or disguise the coarser stuff of ordinary being, but because those energies are the stuff of ordinary being.
If nothing else, the negative specifications of these essays do seem to add up to a surprising discip1inary generalization: given how queer theory and literary criticism are cur-rently structured, it's notable that among seventeen diverse, psychologically searching, very real-world-oriented essays on texts from the past two centuries, not a single one is working directly from inside Freud or Lacan, and few, either, seem to owe much to the narrative and research protocols that typify the New Historicism. Though passionate, they are also not particularly polemical, and they don't greatly feature the disciplining of previous errors of theory or interpretation. If anything, the expansive length of several of the essays seems to reflect a distance from any of those master-figures or master-discourses to which theoretical appeals can today be made in shorthand.
I wouldn't, beforehand, have characterized this particular intellectual moment as likely to offer remarkable resources for a fresh, deroutinized sense of accountability to the real.
Live and learn. By accountability to the real I mean in the first place the many, diverse, but very marked turns these essays take away from existing accounts of how "one" should read, and back toward a grappling with the recalcitrant, fecund question of how one does. It might even be true to say that the psychological/political ambitions of many of the essays take the form of a similar series of turns: from the nonsensical but seemingly uncircumnavigable question of how people should feel to the much harder ones of how they do and of how feelings change. Interestingly, it's also the repeated turn away from the deontological project of "ought" that seems to characterize the unmistakable, though often tacit, ethical gravity and specificity of this work.
As for its queer specificity, I will discuss below why that seems to emerge throughout the essays in such varied and radically contingent forms. I don't think any of these essays would have been writable -thinkable -before or without the gay/lesbian studies and queer theory movements in literary criticism; indeed almost all the authors, who range from current graduate students to foundational figures in these movements, are steeped in those problematics and sensibilities. Yet what seems least settled is any predetermined idea about what makes the queerness of a queer reading. Often these readings begin from or move toward sites of same-sex, interpersonal eroticism -but not necessarily so. It seems to me that an often quiet, but very palpable presiding image here -a kind of genius loci for queer reading -is the interpretive absorption of the child or adolescent whose sense of personal queerness mayor may not (yet?) have resolved into a sexual specificity of proscribed object choice, aim, site, or identification. Such a child -if she reads at all -is reading for important news about herself, without knowing what form that news will take; with only the patchiest familiarity with its codes; without, even, more than hungrily hypothesizing to what questions this news may proffer an answer. The model of such reading is hardly the state of complacent adequacy that Jonathan Culler calls "literary competence," but a much more speculative, superstitious, and methodologically adventurous state where recognitions, pleasures, and discoveries seep in only from the most stretched and ragged edges of one's competence. 1 Aside from the deroutinizing methodologies of these essays, what seems most hauntingly to characterize them is how distant many of them are -from a certain stance of suspicion or paranoia that is common the theoretical work whose disciplinary ambience surrounds them. If the collection can be said to embody anyone, primary premise, it would be that a closer, more respectful attention to past and present queer reading practices -the kind of attention these essays, in their different ways, all embody -will show how the reservoir of practices already in use crucially exceeds the theorizations of a consensual hermeneutic of suspicion. Many of these pieces are, rightly and productively, incisive in their use of a methodical suspicion; but what more unites them is a very different impulse and history, which would be badly misrecognized under the currently available rubrics. In the remainder of this essay -and, I must admit, at the risk of somewhat compromising the nonprogrammatic aesthetic of deontological reticence that otherwise seems to make the flavor of the volume -it is the issue of paranoia and its alternatives that I would like to explore more fully.
Sometime back in the middle of the first decade of the AIDS epidemic, I was picking the brains of a friend of mine, the activist scholar Cindy Patton, about the probable natural history of HIV. This was at a time when speculation was ubiquitous about whether the virus had been deliberately engineered, or spread; whether HIV represe-nted a plot or experiment by the U.S. military that had gotten out of control, or perhaps that was behaving exactly as it was meant to. After hearing a lot from her about the geography and economics of the global traffic in blood products, I finally, with some eagerness, asked Patton what she thought of these sinister rumors about the virus's origin. "Any of the early steps in its spread could have been either accidental or deliberate:" she said. "But I just have trouble getting interested in that. I mean, even suppose we were sure of every element of a conspiracy: that the lives of Africans and African Americans are worthless in the eyes of the United States; that gay men and drug users are held cheap where they aren't actively hated; that the military deliberately researches ways to kill noncombatants whom it sees as enemies; that people in power look calmly on the likelihood of catastrophic environmental and population changes. Supposing we were ever so sure of all those things -what would we know then that we don't already know?"
In the years since that conversation, I've brooded a lot over this response from Patton. Aside from a certain congenial, stony pessimism, I think what I've found enabling about it is that it suggests the possibility of unpacking, of disentangling from their impacted and overdetermined historical relation to each other, some of the separate elements of the intellectual baggage that many of us carry around under a label like "the hermeneutic of suspicion." Patton's comment suggests that for someone to have an unmystified, angry view of large and genuinely systemic opressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin on that person any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences. To know that the origin or spread of HIV realistically might have resulted from a state-assisted conspiracy -such knowledge is, it turns out, separable from the question of whether the energies of a given AIDS activist intellectual or group might best be used in the tracing and exposure of such a possible plot.
They might, but then again, they might not. Though ethically very fraught, the choice is not self-evident; whether or not to undertake this highly compelling tracing-and-exposure project represents a strategic and local decision, not necessarily a categorical imperative. Patton's response to me seemed to open a space for moving from the rather fixated question, "Is a particular piece of knowledge true, and how can we now?" to the further questions, "What does knowledge do -the pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the receiving-again of knowledge of what one already knows? How, in short, is knowledge performative, and how best does one move among its causes and effects?"
I suppose this ought to seem quite an unremarkable epiphany: that knowledge does rather than simply is, it is by now very routine to discover. Yet it seems that a lot of the real force of such discoveries has been blunted through the habitual practices of the same forms of critical theory that have given such broad currency to the formulae themselves. In particular, it may be that the very productive critical habits embodied in what Paul Ricoeur memorably called "hermeneutics of suspicion" -widespread critical habits indeed, perhaps by now nearly synonymous with criticism itself -may have had an unintentionally stultifying sideeffect: they may have made it less rather than more possible to unpack the local, contingent relations between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments for the seeker, knower, or teller.
Ricoeur introduced the category of the "hermeneutic of suspicion" to describe the position of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and their intellecual offspring within a context that also included such alternative disciplinary hermeneutics as the philological and theological "hermeneutic of recovery of meaning." 2 His intent in offering the former of these formulations was descriptive and taxonomic rather than imperative. In the context of recent U.S. critical theory, however, where Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud by themselves are taken as constituting a pretty sufficient genealogy for the mainstream of New Historicist, deconstructive, feminist, queer, and psychoanalytic criticism, to apply a "hermeneutic of suspicion" is, I believe, widely understood as a mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among other possibilities. The phrase now has something like the sacred status of Fredric Jameson's "Always historicize" -and, like that one, it fits oddly into its new position in the tablets of the Law. Always historicize? What could have less to do with historicizing than the commanding, atemporal adverb "always"? It reminds me of the common bumper stickers that instruct people in other cars to "Question Authority." Excellent advice, perhaps wasted on anyone who does whatever they're ordered to do by a strip of paper glued to the bumper of an automobile! The imperative framing will do funny things to a hermeneutic of suspicion.
Not surprisingly, the methodological centrality of suspicion to current critical practice has involved a concomitant privileging of the concept of paranoia. In the last paragraphs of 4 The man of suspicion double-bluffing the man of guile: in the hands of thinkers after Freud, paranoia has by now candidly become less a diagnosis than a prescription. In a world where no one need be delusional to find evidence of systemic oppression, to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naive, pious, or complaisant. I myself have no wish to return to the use of "paranoid" as a pathologizing diagnosis; but it seems to me a great loss whan paranoid inquiry comes to seem entirely coextensive with critical theoretical inquiry, rather than being viewed as one kind of cognitive/affective theorefical practice among other, alternative kinds.
Even aside from the prestige that now attaches to a hermeneutic of suspicion in critical theory as a whole, queer studies in particular has had a distinctive history of intimacy with the paranoid imperative. Freud, of course, traced every instance of paranoia to the repression of specifically same-sex desire, whether in women or in men. The traditional, homophobic psychoanalytic use that has generally been made of Freud's association has been to pathologize homosexuals as paranoid, or to consider paranoia a distinctively homosexual disease. In Homosexual Desire, however, a 1972 book translated into English in 1978, Guy
Hocquenghem returned to Freud's formulations in order to draw from them a conclusion that would not reproduce this damaging non sequitur. If paranoia reflects the repression of samesex desire, Hocquenghem reasoned, then paranoia is a uniquely privileged site for illuminating not homosexuality itself, as in the Freudian tradition, but rather precisely the mechanisms of homophobic and heterosexist enforcement against it. 5 What is illuminated by an understanding of paranoia is not how homosexuality works, but how homophobia and heterosexism work -in'short, if one understands these oppressions to be systemic, how the world works.
Paranoia, thus, became by the mid-198os a privileged object of antihomophobic theory. How did it sread so quickly from that status to being its uniquely sanctioned methodology? I have been looking back into my own writing of the 198os as well as that of some other critics, trying to retrace that transition -one that seems worthy of remark now but seemed at the time, I think, the most natural move in the world. Part of the explanation lies in a property of paranoia itself: simply put, paranoia tends to be contagious. More specifically, paranoia is drawn toward and tends to construct symmetrical relations, and in particular symmetrical epistemologies. As Leo Bersani writes, "To inspire interest is to be guaranteed a paranoid reading, just as we must inevitably be suspicious of the interpretations we inspire. Paranoia is an inescapable interpretive doubling of presence." 6 It sets a thief (and if necessary, becomes one) to catch a thief; it mobilizes guile against suspicion, suspicion against guile; "it takes one to know one." A paranoid friend, who believes I am reading her mind, knows this from reading mine; also a suspicious writer, she is always turning up at crime scenes of plagiarism, indifferently as perpetrator or as victim; a litigious colleague as well, she not only imagines me to be as familiar with the laws of libel as she is, but eventually makes me become so. (All these examples, by the way, are fictitious.)
Given that paranoia seems to have a peculiarly intimate relation to the phobic dynamics around homosexuality, then, it may have been structurally inevitable that the reading practices that became most available and fruitful in antihomophobic work would often in turn have been paranoid ones. There must have been historical as well as structural reasons for this development, however, since it is less easy to account on structural terms for the frequent privileging of paranoid methodologies in recent non-queer critical projects such as feminist theory, psychoanalytic theory, deconstruction, Marxist criticism, or the New Historicism. One recent discussion of paranoia invokes "a popular maxim of the late 1960s: 'Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you.' " 7 And in fact it seems quite plausible to me that some version of this axiom (perhaps "Even a paranoid can have enemies," uttered by Henry Kissinger!) 8 is so indelibly inscribed in the brains of us babyboomers that it offers us the continuing illusion of possessing a special insight into the epistemologies of enmity. My impression, again, is that, we are liable to produce this constative formulation as fiercely as if it had a self-evident imperative force: the notation that even paranoid people have enemies is wielded as if its absolutely necessary corollary were the injunction, " -so you can never be paranoid enough."
But the truth-value of the original axiom, assuming it to be true, doesn't actually make a paranoid imperative self-evident. Learning that "just because you're paranoid doesn't mean you don't have enemies," somebody might deduce that being paranoid is not an effective way to get rid of enemies. Rather than concluding " -so you can never be paranoid enough, " this person might instead be moved to reflect, " -but then, just because you have enemies doesn't mean you have to be paranoid." That is to say, once again: for someone to have an The greatest interest of Klein's concept lies, it seems to me, in her seeing the paranoid position always in the oscillatory context of a very different possible one, the depressive position, For Klein's infant or adult, the paranoid position -understandably marked by hatred, envy, and anxiety -is a position of terrible alertness to the dangers posed by the hateful and envious part-objects that one defensively projects into, carves out of, and ingests from the world around one. By contrast, the depressive position is an anxiety-mitigating achievement that the infant or adult only sometimes, and often only briefly, succeeds in inhabiting: this is the position from which it is possible in turn to use one's own resources to assemble or "repair" the murderous part-objects into something like a whole -though not, and may I emphasize this, not necessarily like any preexisting whole. Once assembled to one's own specifications, the more satisfying object is available both to be identified with and to offer one nourishment and comfort in turn. Among Klein's names for the reparative process is love. 10 Given the instability and mutual inscription built into the Kleinian notion of positions, I
am also, in the present project, interested in doing justice to .the powerful reparative practices that, I am convinced infuse self-avowedly paranoid critical projects; as well as to the paranoid exigencies that are often necessary for non-paranoid knowing and utterance. For example, Patton's calm response to me about the origins of HIV drew on a lot of research, her own and other people's, much of which required to be paranoiacally structured. Paranoia is reflexive and mimetic.
Paranoia is a strong theory.
Paranoia is a theory of negative affects.
Paranoia places its faith in exposure. at every psychic juncture, of the facts (however factitious) of "sexual difference" and "the phallus." From such often tautological work, it would be hard to learn that -from Freud onward, including for example the later writings of Melanie Klein -the history of psychoanalytic thought offers richly divergent, heterogeneous tools for thinking about aspects of personhood, consciousness, affect, filiation, social dynamics, and sexuality that, while relevant to the experince of gender and queerness, are often not centrally organized around "sexual difference" at all. Not that they are necessarily prior to "sexual difference": they may simply be conceptualized as somewhere to the side of it, tangentially or contingently related or even rather unrelated to it.
Seemingly, the reservoir of such thought and speculation could make an important resource for theorists commited to thinking about human lives otherwise than through the prejudicious gender reifications that are common in psychoanalysis, as in other projects of modern philosophy and science. What has happened instead, I think, is something like the following. First, through what might be called a process of vigilant scanning, feminists and queers have rightly understood that no topic or area of psychoanalytic thought can be declared a priori immune to the influence of such gender reifications. Second, however -and it seems to me, unnecessarily and often damagingly -the lack of such a priori immunity, the absence of any guaranteed-nonprejudicial point of beginning for feminist thought within psy-choanalysis, has led to the widespread adoption by some thinkers of an anticipatory mimetic strategy whereby a certain, stylized violence of sexual differentiation must always be presumed or self-assumed -even, where necessary, imposed -simply on the ground that it can never be finally ruled out.
(1 don't want to suggest, in using the word "mimetic," that these uses of psychoanalytic gender categories need be either uncritical of, or identical to, the originals: Judith Butler, among others, has taught us a much less deadening use of "mimetic.") But, for example, in this post-Lacanian tradition, psychoanalytic thought that is not in the first place centrally organized around phallic "sexual difference" must seemingly be translated, with however distorting results, into that language before it can be put to any other theoretical use. The contingent possibilities of thinking otherwise than through "sexual difference" are subordinated to the paranoid imperative that, if the violence of such gender reification cannot be definitively halted in advance, it must at least never arrive on any conceptual scene as a surprise. In a paranoid view, it is more dangerous for such reification ever to be unanticipated than often to be unchallenged. irreducibly corporeal, is also centrally shaped, trough the feedback process, by its access to just such theoretical meta-levels. In Tomkins, there is no distance at all between affect theory in the sense of the important explicit theorizing some scientists and philosophers do around affects, and affect theory in the sense of the largely tacit theorizing all people do in experiencing and trying to deal with their own and others' affects.
To call paranoia a "strong theory" is, then, at the same time to congratulate it as a big achievement -it's a strong theory rather as, for Harold Bloom, Milton is a strong poet -but also to classifyit. It is one kind of affect theory among other possible kinds, and by Tomkins's account, a number of interrelated affect theories of different kinds and strengths are likely to constitute the mental life of any individual. Most pointedly, the contrast of strong theory in
Tomkins is with weak theory, and the contrast is not in every respect to the advantage of the strong kind. The reach and reductiveness of strong theory -that is, its conceptual economy or elegance -involve both assets and deficits. What Characterizes strong theory in Tomkins is not, after all, how well it avoids negative affect or finds positive affect, but the size and topology of the domain that it organizes. "Any theory of wide generality," he writes, is capable of accounting for a wide spectrum of phenomena which appear to be very remote, one from the other, and from a common source. This is a commonly accepted criterion by which the explanatory power of any scientific theory can be evaluated. To the extent to which the theory can account only for "near" phenomena, it is a weak theory, little better than a description of the phenomena which it purports to explain. As it orders more and more remote phenomena to a single formulation, its power grows. . . . A humiliation theory is strong to the extent to which it enables more and more experiences to be accounted for as instances of humiliating experiences on the one hand, or to the extent to which it enables more and more anticipation of such contingencies before they actually happen." 14 As this account suggests, far from becoming stronger through obviating or alleviating humiliation, a humiliation theory becomes stronger exactly insofar as it fails to do so. 15 Tomkins's conclusion is not that all strong theory is ineffective -indeed, it may grow to be only too effective -but that "affect theory must be effective to be weak":
We can now see more clearly that although a restricted and weak theory may not always successfully protect the individual against negative affect, it is difficult for it to remain weak unless it does so. Conversely, a negative affect theory gains in strength, paradoxically, by virtue of the continuing failures of its strategies to afford protection through successful avoidance of the experience of negative affect. . . . It is the repeated and apparently uncontrollable spread of the experience of negative affect which prompts the increasing strength of the ideo-affective organization which we have called a strong affect theory. (2:323-
24)
An affect theory is, among other things, a mode of selective scanning and amplification; for this reason, any affect theory risks being somewhat tautological, but because of its wide reach and rigorous exclusiveness, a strong theory risks being strongly tautological.
We have said that there is over-organization in monopolistic humiliation theory. By this we mean not only that there is excessive integration between sub-systems which are normally more independent, but also that each sub-system is over-specialized in the interests of minimizing the experience of humiliation. . . . The entire cognitive apparatus is in a constant state of alert for possibilities, imminent or remote, ambiguous 13 or clear. This is how it happens that an explanatory structure that a reader may see as tautological, in that it can't help or can't stop or can't do anything other than proving the very same assumptions with which it began, may be experienced by the practitioner as a triumphant advance toward truth and vindication.
More usually, however, the roles in this drama are more mixed or more widely distributed. I don't suppose that too many readers -nor, for that matter, perhaps the author -would be too surprised to hear it noted that the main argument or "strong theory" of The Novel and the Police is entirely circular: everything can be understood as an aspect of the carceral, therefore the carceral is everywhere. But who reads The Novel and the Police to find out whether its main argument is true? In this case, as also frequently in the case of the tautologies of "sexual difference," the very breadth of reach that makes the theory strong also offers the space -of which this book takes every advantage -for a wealth of tonal nuance, attitude, worldly observation, performative paradox, aggression, tenderness, wit, inventive reading, obiter dicta, and writerly panache. These rewards are so local and frequent that one might want to say that a plethora of only loosely related weak theories has been invited to shelter in the hypertrophied embrace of the book's overarching strong theory. In many ways, such an arrangement is all to the good -suggestive, pleasurable, and highly productive; an insistence that everything means one thing somehow permits a sharpened sense of all the ways there are of meaning it. But one need not read an infinite number of students' and other critics' derivative rephrasings of the book's grimly strong theory to see, as well, some limitations of this unarticulated relation between strong and weak theories. As strong theory, and as a locus of reflexive mimeticism, paranoia is nothing if not teachable. The powerfully ranging and reductive force of strong theory can make tautological thinking hard to identify, even as it makes it compelling and near-inevitable; the result is that both writers and readers can damagingly misrecognize whether and where real conceptual work is getting done, and precisely what that work might be. With the passage of time since the New Historicism was new, it's becoming easier to see ways in which such a paranoid project of exposure may be more historically specific than it seems. "The modern liberal subject": in the latter I990s it seems, or at least ought to seem, anything but an obvious choice as the unique terminus ad quem of historical narrative.
Where are all these supposed modern liberal subjects? I daily encounter graduate students who are dab hands at unveiling the hidden historical violences that underlie a secular, universalist liberal humanism. Yet these students' sentient years -unlike the formative years of their teachers -have been spent entirely in a xenophobic Reagan-Bush-Clinton America where "liberal" is, if anything, a taboo category; and where "secular humanism" is routinely treated as a marginal religious sect, while a vast majority of the population claims to engage in direct intercourse with multiple invisible entities such as angels, Satan, and God.
Furthermore, the force of any interpretive project of unveiling hidden violence would seem to depend on a cultural context, like the one assumed in Foucault's early works, in which violence would be deprecated and hence hidden in the first place. Why bother exposing the ruses of power in a country where, at any given moment, 40 percent of young black men are enrolled in the penal system? In the United States and internationally, while there is plenty of hidden violence that requires exposure, there is also, and increasingly, an ethos where forms of violence that are hyper-visible from the start may be offered as an exemplary spectacle, rather than remaining to be unveiled as a scandalous secret. Human rights controversy around, for example, torture and disappearances in Argentina, or the use of mass rape as part of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, marks -not an unveiling of practices that had been hidden or naturalized -but a wrestle of different frameworks of visibility. That is, violence that was from the beginning exemplary and spectacular, pointedly addressed, meant to serve as a public warning or terror to members of a particular community, is combated by efforts to displace and redirect (as well as simply expand) its aperture of visibility.
A further problem with these critical practices: what does a hermeneutic of suspicion and exposure have to say to social formations in which visibility itself constitutes much of the violence? The point of the move to reinstate chain gangs in several Southern states is less that convicts be required to perform hard labor than that they be required to do so under the gaze of the public; and the enthusiasm for Singapore-style justice that was popularly ex- The paranoid trust in exposure seemingly depends, in addition, on an infinite reservoir of naïveté in those who make up the audience for these unveilings. What is the basis for assuming that it will surprise or disturb -never mind motivate -anyone to learn that a given social manifestation is artificial, self-contradictory, imitative, phantasmatic, or even violent?
As Peter Sloterdijk points out, cynicism or "enlightened false consciousness" -false consciousness that knows itself to be false, "its falseness already reflexively buffered" -already represents "the universally widespread way in which enlightened people see to it that they are not taken for suckers." 19 How television-starved would someone have to be to find it shocking that ideologies contradict themselves, that simu-( lacra don't have originals, or that gender representations are artifical? My own guess would be that such popular cynicism, while undoubtedly widespread, is only one among the heterogeneous, competing theories that constitute the mental ecology of most people. Some exposes, some demystifications, some bearings of witness do have great effectual force (though often of an unanticipated kind). Many that are just as true and convincing have none at all, however; and as long as that is so, we must admit that the efficacy and directionality of such acts reside somewhere else than in their relation to knowledge per se. wing press, in the contemporary American right wing, and on both sides of the race controversy today") . 20 Although these categories would seem to cover a lot of people, there remains nonetheless a presumptive "we" -apparently still practically everyone -that can agree to view such extremes from a calm, understanding, and encompassing middle ground, where "we" can all agree that, for example, while "innumerable decisions of. . . the cold war can be faulted," they represent "simply the mistakes of well-meaning men" (36). Hofstadter has no trouble admitting that paranoid people or movements can perceive true things, though "a distorted style is. . . a possible signal that may alert us to a distorted judgment, just as in art an ugly style is a cue to fundamental defects of taste" (6) .
A few simple and relatively non-controversial examples may make [the distinction between content and style] wholly clear. Shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, a great deal of publicity was given to a bill . . . to tighten federal controls over the sale of firearms through the mail. When hearings were being held on the measure,three men drove 2,500 miles to Washington from Bagdad, Arizona, to testify against it. Now there are arguments against the Dodd bill which, however unpersuasive one may find them, have the color of conventional political reasoning. But one of the Arizonans opposed it with what might be considered representative paranoid arguments, insisting that it was "a further attempt by a subversive power to make us part of one world socialistic government" and that it threatened to "create chaos" that would help "our enemies" to seize power. (5) I won't deny that a person could get nostalgic for a time when paranoid gun-lobby rhetoric sounded just plain nutty -a "simple and relatively non-controversial" example of "distorted judgment" -rather than representing the uncontested platform of a dominant political party.
But the spectacular datedness of Hofstadter's example isn't only an index of how far the American political center has shifted toward the right since 1963. It's also a sign of how normative such paranoid thinking has become at every point in the political spectrum. In a funny way, I feel closer today to that paranoid Arizonan than I do to Hofstadter -even though (or do I mean because?) I also assume that the Arizonan is a homophobic whitesupremacist Christian Identity militia member who would as soon blow me away as look at me. Peter Sloterdijk does not make explicit that the wised-up popular cynicism or "enlightened false consciousness" that he considers now to be near-ubiquitous is, specifically, paranoid in structure; but that conclusion seems inescapable. Arguably, such narrow-gauge, everyday, rather incoher- is its diminished to environmental (for instance, political) change.
Another, perhaps more nearly accurate way of describing the present paranoid consensus, however, is that rather than entirely displacing, it may simply have required a certain disarticulation, disavowal, and misrecognition of other ways of knowing -ways less oriented around suspicion -that are actually being practiced, often by the same theorists and as part of the same projects. The monopolistic program of paranoid knowing systematically disallows any explicit recourse to reparative motives, no sooner to be articulated than subject to methodical uprooting. Reparative motives, once they become explicit, are inadmissable within paranoid theory both because they are about pleasure ("merely aesthetic") and because they are frankly ameliorative ("merely reformist") . 21 What makes pleasure and amelioration so qualitatively affects everyday knowledge and experience; and suppose that one doesn't want to draw much ontological distinction between academic theory and everyday theory; and suppose that one has a lot of concern for the quality of other people's and one's own practices of knowing and experiencing. In these cases, it would make sense -if one had the choice -not to cultivate the necessity of a systematic, self-accelerating split between what one is doing and the reasons for which one does it.
To change one's understanding of the reasons for one's practice, or the meanings of one's practice -is it, or is it not, under this understanding of theory, to change one's practice?
I ask this question seriously, and I take it to be a productive, overarching rubric under which to approach the essays in the present volume. There's a built-in gracelessness to the expectation that any essay will end with an explanation of exactly what it is that the writer is "calling for." ("Calling for," as if critical practices were ready-made consumer items among which one had only to choose -"Mabel, Black Label!" Or maybe as if one were a doctor, whose expensive expertise goes into the writing of the right prescription, leaving to some commercial functionary the work of filling it as ordered. ) That gracelessness can only be amplified when the essay in question is an introduction to other essays by other writers: as if any one person either had all along anticipated, or were now in a position to sum up and adjudicate, so rich a diversity of projects. My prescription -or really, I think, my proposition -here is very modest:
that our work grows more interesting, more responsive, more truthful, and more useful as we try to account for its motives in a less stylized fashion than we have been. Perhaps the unpacking, above, of several different elements of paranoid thought can suggest several specific, divergent dimensions in which alternative approaches may also be available -may indeed be in practice in these pages.
While paranoid theoretical proceedings both depend upon and reinforce the structural dominance of monopolistic "strong theory," there may also be benefit in exploring the extremely varied, dynamic, and historically contingent ways that strong theoretical constructs interact with weak ones in the ecology of knowing -an exploration that obviously can't proceed without a respectful interest in weak as well as strong theoretical acts. Tomkins offers far more models for approaching such a project than I've been able to summarize. But the history of literary criticism can also be viewed as a repertoire of alternative models for allowing strong and weak theory to interdigitate. One notable feature of Novel Gazing, for example, is the centrality in so many of these essays of an unhurried, undefensive, theoretically galvanized practice of close reading. What could better represent "weak theory, little better than a description of the phenomena which it purports to explain" than this devalued and nearobsolescent New Critical skill? 22 But what was already true in Empson and Burke is true in a different way in these essays: there are important and theoretical tasks that can be accomplished only local theories and nonce taxonomies; the potentially innumerable mechanisms of their relation to stronger theories remains the matter and speculative thought.
Paranoia, as we have pointed out, represents not only a strong affect theory but a strong negative affect theory. A strong theory (that is, a wideranging and reductive one) that was not mainly organized around anticipating, identifying, and warding off the negative affect of humiliation would resemble paranoia in some respects, but differ from it in others. I think, for example, that that might be a fair characterization of the preceding section of the present essay. The question of the strength of a given theory (or that of the relations between strong and weak theory) may be orthogonal to the question of its affective quale, and each may be capable of exploration by different means. It does seem to me that the most powerful pieces in this collection -even profoundly sad pieces skill readers at attending to, rather than having to disavow, the workings of positive affect in projects where only negative affect theories have so far had much structuring force.
Since even the specification of paranoia as a theory of negative affect leaves open the distinctions between or among negative affects, there is the additional opportunity of experimenting with a vocabulary that will do justice to a wide affective range. Again, not only with the negative affects: it can also be reifying and, indeed, coercive to have only one, totalizing model of positive affect always in the same featured position. A disturbingly large amount of theory seems explicitly to undertake the proliferation of only one affect or maybe two, of whatever kind -whether ecstasy, sublimity, self-shattering, jouissance, suspicion, abjection, knowingness, horror, grim satisfaction, or righteous indignation. It's like the old joke: "Comes the revolution, Comrade, everyone gets to eat roast beef every day." "But
Comrade, I don't like roast beef." "Comes the revolution, Comrade, you'll like roast beef."
Comes the revolution, Comrade, you'll be tickled pink by those deconstructive jokes; you'll faint from ennui every minute that you're not smashing the state apparatus; you'll definitely want hot sex twenty to thirty times a day. You'll be mournful and militant. You'll never want to tell Deleuze and Guattari, "Not tonight, dears, I have a headache."
To recognize in paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once anticipatory and retroactive, averse above all to surprise, is also to glimpse the lineaments of other possibilities. Here, perhaps, Klein is of more help than Tomkins: to read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new: to a reparatively positioned reader, it can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there can also be good ones. Hope, often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, is among the energies by which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and part-objects she encounters or creates. 23 Because she has room to realize that the future may be different from the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did. 24 Where does this argument leave projects of queer reading, in particular? With the relative deemphasis of the question of "sexual difference" and sexual "sameness," and with the possibility of moving from a Freudian, homophobia-centered understanding of paranoia to other understandings of it, like Klein's or Tomkins's, that are not particularly Oedipal and are less drive-oriented than affect-oriented, I am also suggesting that the mutual inscription of queer thought with the topic of paranoia may be less necessary, less definitional, less completely constitutive than earlier writing on it, very much including my own, has assumed.
A more ecological view of paranoia wouldn't offer the same transhistorical, almost automatic conceptual privileging of gay/lesbian issues that is offered by a Freudian view.
On the other hand, I think it will leave us in a vastly better position to do justice to a wealth of characteristic, culturally central practices, many of which can well be called reparative, that emerge from queer experience but become invisible or illegible under a paranoid optic. As Joseph Litvak writes, for example, It seems to me that the importance of "mistakes" in queer reading and writing. . . has a lot to do with loosening the traumatic, inevitable-seeming connection between mistakes and humiliation. What I mean is that, if a lot of queer energy, say around adolescence, goes into what Barthes calls "le vouloir-etre-intelligent" (as in "If I have to be miserable, at least let me be brainier than everybody else") , accounting in large part for paranoia's enormous prestige as the very signature of smartness (a smartness that smarts), a lot of queer energy, later on, goes into. . . practices aimed at taking the terror out of error, at making the making of mistakes sexy, creative, even cognitively powerful. Doesn't reading queer mean learning, among other things, that mistakes can be good rather than bad surprises?
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It's appropriate, I think, that these insights would be contingent developments, rather than definitional or transhistorical ones -they aren't things that would inevitably inhere in the experience of every woman-loving woman or man-loving man, say. For if, as we've shown, a paranoid reading practice is closely tied to a notion of the inevitable, there are, as this demonstrates, other features of queer reading that can attune it exquisitely to a heartbeat of contingency.
The dogged, defensive narrative stiffness of a paranoid temporality, after all, in which yesterday can't be allowed to have differed from today and tomorrow must be even more so, takes its shape from a generational narrative that's characterized by a distinctly Oedipal regularity and repetitiveness: it happened to my father's father, it happened to my father, it is happening to me, it will happen to my son, and it will happen to my son's son. But isn't it a feature of queer possibility -only a contingent feature, but a real one, and one that in turn strengthens the force of contingency itself -that our generational relations don't always proceed in this lockstep ?
Think of the epiphanic, extravagantly reparative final volume of Proust, in which the narrator, after a long withdrawal from society, goes to a party where he at first thinks everyone is sporting elaborate costumes pretending to be ancient -then realizes that they are old, and so is he -and is then assailed, in half a dozen distinct mnemonic shocks, by a climactic series of joy-inducing "truths" about the relation of writing to time. The narrator never says so, but isn't it worth pointing out that the complete temporal disorientation that initiates him into this revelatory space would have been impossible in a heterosexual pere de famille, in one who had meanwhile been embodying, in the form of inexorably "progressing" identities and roles, the regular arrival of children and grandchildren?
And now I began to understand what old age was -old age, which perhaps of all the realities is the one of which we preserve for longest in our life a purely abstract conception, looking at calendars, dating our letters, seeing our friends marry and then in their turn the children of our friends, and yet, either from fear or from sloth, not understanding what all this means, until the day when we behold an unknown silhouette. . . which teaches us that we are living in a new world; until the day when a grandson of a woman we once knew, a young man whom instinctively we treat as a contemporary of ours, smiles as though we were making fun of him because it seems that we are old enough to be his grandfather-and I began to understand too what death meant and love and the joys of the spiritual life, the usefulness of suffering, a vocation, etc. It's hard to say, hard even to know, how these relationships are different from those shared by people of different ages on a landscape whose perspectival lines converge on a common disappearing-point. I'm sure ours are more intensely motivated: whatever else we know, we know there isn't time to bullshit. But what it means to identify with each other must also be very different. On this scene, an older person doesn't love a younger as someone who will someday be where she now is, or vice versa. No one is, so to speak, carrying for-ward the family name; there's a sense in which our life narratives will barely overlap. There's another sense in which they slide up more intimately alongside one another than can any lives that are moving forward according to the regular schedule of the generations. It is one another immediately, one another as the present fullness of a becoming whose arc may extend no further, whom we each must learn best to apprehend, fulfill, and bear company.
At a textual level, it seems to me that related practices of reparative knowing may lie, barely recognized and little explored, at the heart of many histories of gay, lesbian, and queer intertextuality. The queeridentified practice of camp, for example, may be seriously misrecognized when it is viewed, as Butler and others view it, through paranoid lenses. As we've seen, camp is currently understood as uniquely appropriate to the projects of parody, denaturalization, demystification, and mocking exposure of the elements and assumptions of a dominant culture; and the degree to which camping is motivated by love seems often to be understood mainly as the degree of its self-hating complicity with an oppressive status quo.
By this account, the X-ray gaze of the paranoid impulse in camp sees through to an unfleshed skeleton of the culture; the paranoid aesthetic on view here is one of minimalist elegance and conceptual economy.
The desire of a reparative impulse, on the other hand, is additive and accretive. Its fear, a realistic one, is that the culture surrounding it is inadequate or inimical to its nurture; it wants to assemble and confer plenitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self. To view camp as, among other things, the communal, historically dense exploration of a variety of reparative practices is to be able to be able to do better justice to many of the defining elements of classic camp performance: the startling, juicy displays of excess erudition, for example; the passionate, often hilarious antiquarianism, the prodigal production of alternate historiographies; the "over"-attachment to fragmentary, marginal, waste, or leftover products; the rich, highly interruptive affective variety; the irrepressible fas- invited by a universe of speculation and feeling in which the parasitic demand of "information" to be transmitted, of codes to be decoded, and thought to be thought, is entirely interfolded with the yearning and mortification of the skin, and the imperious bodily structurations of grievous memory and historic trauma.
With the next essay, Joseph Litvak turns from touch toward taste. In "Strange Gourmet: Taste, Waste, Proust," he undertakes to delineate something like "an object-relations theory" of sophistication, "a theory that will explain how sophistication maps out a certain fantasmatic way of circulating in and around the world -not, as may seem to be the case, of simply rising above it but, at least in Proust's case, of connecting the 'high' and the 'low' so as to short-circuit the middle." In proper Kleinian fashion, Litvak approaches Proust through a narrative of the gullet, emphasizing good and bad mouth-objects and complex inner pleasures (the "stranger" or gamier -that is to say, the "higher"-the better). If you aren't squeamish about digestive processes, then there's always a sense in which you can eat your cake and have it, too; "re-senting, re-tasting, re-finding the badness of the bad object, saving that badness from falling into the mere banality of the merely deidealized, [has] the additional virtue, in other words, of helping one save oneself."
Returning to the fingers, "Outing Texture," Renu Bora's deeply original essay on The Ambassadors, offers theoretical tools at once for an erotics and a metaphysics of texture.
Occupying "the borders of properties of touch and vision," texture dramatizes both the disjunctures and displacements between the two senses (as in certain traditions of understanding fetishism), and their common materialities. Another tension: texture, as surfacial, can signify the exact opposite of structure; while texture, as structure (think of sand, brick, feces), can also offer the most graphic sensual manifestation of the immanence of production processes and histories. Bora touches both on the objects in James -fabrics and bibelots, as well as erotic objects -and on the narrative touch of "James" himself: what, Bora finally asks, is the texture of innuendo?
In Novel Gazing. While no one would be surprised to learn that capitalism depends on generating interest, Nunokawa's project here is to show how fully it also depends on generating tedium. More specifically, it is consumer culture whose relation to boredom is articulated through a (paradoxically fascinating) reading of "the intimacy between advertising and aesthetics" in Wilde -and between both of these and a centuries-long, sublimatory tradition of male intergenerational desire.
Michael Lucey points out early in his essay, "Balzac's Queer Cousins and Their
Friends," that Balzac is one of the novelists who can seem most to fuse into one totalizing, seamless whole the "two projects" of hegemonic power: "portraying a world, and helping suture us to it." Lucey's essay, however, while it is interested in such "parallels," is most interested in maintaining them as parallel -that is, in attending to and making use of the irreducible distances that live between the lines. Between the needs of a system called "family" and the needs of a system of capital accumulation there are also such parallels, condensed for instance in the Foucauldian concept of "alliance." Lucey is drawn to Cousin Bette and Cousin
Pons because the novels center on "bachelor and spinster cousins, family misfits and remainders," "parasitic on the family, yet also radically other to it." He is also, however, sharply yet ambivalently drawn into Balzac's disavowed solicitations for the reader to interpret Bette's and Pons's ontologies precisely as sexual. "The slack in the cord that links sentiment or affect or sexuality to family structure" is, as he shows, the place of a crucially contingent crossing between perverse sexual itineraries and circuitous economic trajectories. That "these frightened and fragile gestures of queer self-recognition . . . be taken seriously,"
and even come to be supported by "a rich texture of spontaneous presumption," is part of
Creech's project; another part is to suggest a queer male genealogy alternative to the popu- American man and a white man.
It might make sense to describe as a "dancing essay" Stephen Barber's discussion of
The Years and Between the Acts in "Lip-Reading: Woolf's Secret Encounters." If this is dancing, however, it is secret and for that matter strange dancing: the dance of lips, fingers, eyes.
Digital dancing maybe, it signifies the brush of recognitions that both strain toward language and systematically elude it. Specifically these "unnarrativizable miracles" are the slantwise
